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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MONNA McBROOM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
9702

vs.

HOWARD KIRTLEY McBRO,OM,
Defendant 1and Respondent.
Plaintiff's Brief with Respect to the Appeal
By Plaintiff from th·e Decision of the
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This matter came on for hearing on motion
by the defendant for an order to show cause, ordering the plaintiff to show cause why the court should
not fix visitation rights, restrain the plaintiff from
punishing the children, restrain the plaintiff from
removing the children from the State of Utah without
the express permission of the court; an·d on the plaintiff's answer thereto and counter-petition, wherein
the plaintiff petitioned the court for a judgment
for delinquent support money under the decree of
divorce in the sum of $200.00, to hold defendant in
contempt of court for wilfully failing and refusing
1
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to pay said money, and to restrain the defendant
from coming upon the home premises of the plaintiff at 583 Cortez Street, for attorneys fees and costs
of court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on the 9th and 11th days of
July, 1962 before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow.
From the decree of Judge Snow, the plaintiff appeals
from the 'visitation provisions set forth in said order,
the failure of the._court ~o grant judgment for the
sum of $200.00 delinquent support money, the failure
of the court to restrain defendant from interfering
\vith the plaintiff's job or harassing the plaintiff at
home or at work on the telephon·e or in any other
manner, and from threatening the plaintiff with
bodily harm; from the order restraining plaintiff
from _taking the minor children from the State of
Utah without first securing th·e consent and permission of the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks -(1) a judgment for $200.00
delinquent support money to and including the 23rd
day of June, 1962; (2) for visitation in accordance
with the plaintiff's petition; (3) a restraining order
restraining the defendant from interfering with the
plaintiff's job, or harassing the plaintiff at home or
at work on the telephone or in any other manner,
and to restrain the defendant from threatening the
plaintiff with bodily harm; (4) to vacate the re2
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straining order restraining plaintiff from removing
the children from the State of Utah without the
express permission of the court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered by
the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, judge of the above
entitled court, the defendant was ordered to pay
to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month per child
for the support and maintenance of the minor children. Said payments were to commence as of the
23rd day of March, 1962, and to be paid through the
clerk of the court of Salt Lake County. R. 42, 43,
and 44. Pursuant to Exhibit D (a) (1), th·e defendant produced receipts showing $200.00 paid on May
2, 196'2, $200.00 paid on M·ay 31, 1962, and $200.00
paid on June 29, 1962. Accordingly, defendant is
delinquent $200.00 in his support money, for which
plaintiff should be awarded judgment. The other
receipts which are part of defendant's Exhibit D
(a) (1) show payment of $200.00 on February 2, 1962,
a payment of $100.00 on March 1, 1962, a payn1ent
of $75.00 on March 1, 1962, and payment of a water
bill of $25.00 on March 1, 1962; all of said receipts
being prior to the entry of the decree and the commencement of the $200.00 pursuant to said decree
of divorce.
With respect to the visitation of the minor
children, both plaintiff and defendant sought an
order whereby specific times would be set up for
the visitation of the minor children by the defend3
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ant. The plaintiff proposed that defendant be given
the right to take the children and have th·em over
night with hin1 every other weekend from Friday,
at 6:00 o'clock p.m., until the following Saturday at
6:00 o'clock, and for the alternate weekends to have
them on Sundays from 1:00 o'clock p . m. until 7:30
p.m. in the evening. R. 627. In view of the fact
th·at plaintiff \V1as working five days a week, plaintiff
requested the right to hav·e them each Sunday mornin~g in order (to take them to Sunday School. R. 627.
The defendant complained that plaintiff was
not allowing him to see the children; wh·ereupon
plaintiff testified that the defendant had visited and
taken the children on the following occasions: 18th
of March 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; March 26th
from 3:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.; Sunday, April 1st
from 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; April 6th until
5:30 p.m.; Saturday, April 7th the defendant picked
Kirt, the boy, up off the street at 3:00 p ..m. and did
not return him until 6:00 p.m.; the following Sunday
from 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; the lOth of April
from 12:00 o'clock until1:00 o'clock; April 12th from
3:30 p.m. until 5:30 p.m.; Friday, the 13th of April,
from 3:30 until 5:30 p.m.; April 14th, April 15th,
from 12:00 noon until 8:00 p.m.; on Friday, April
20th, he picked them up at 3:20 p.m. and returned
them the following Sunday night at 8:30 p. m., this
was the Easter Weekend; April 23rd one hour with
them at the tenders; April 24th an hour after school
at the tenders and also th·e 25th of April; on Sunday
4
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Aptil 29th from 12:00 noon until 7:30 p.n1.; on May
4th defendant picked the little girl up and took her
to the beauty parlor and had her until that evening;
May 6th, a Sunday, they had the measles and could
not go with defendant; the following week he called
them every day at the tenders to see how they were,
and saw them every day. Friday, the 11th of May,
he picked them up after school and kept them over
night, returning them the following Saturday morning. May 13th, Mother's Day, he had them from
12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; May 18th he was at the
tenders with the children from 3:00 until 4:30p.m.;
May 20th from 12:00 noon until 7:30 p.m.; on the
24th of May from 3:30 until 5:30 p.m.; on the 25th
of May he picked them up after school and kept
them over night until the following Saturday at
noon; the following Sunday he had them from 12:00
noon until 3:30 p.m. Th·e following Monday he had
them from 3:30 until 5:00 p.m. The 29th of May,
the last day of school, he picked them up from school
and kept them that night and all the following day,
\rhich was Memorial Day, without any permission
or advance notice. On June 1st from 3:00 until 4:00
at the tenders; June 4th, 5th and 6th he visited them
at the tenders from 20 to 45 minutes each day; on
June 8th from .2:00 until 4:00 o'clock; June 17th
from 12:00 noon until 9:00 p.m; Sunday, June 24th
from noon until 9:00 o'clock.
The above testimony of plaintiff is set forth at
pages R. 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633.
5
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Plaintiff testified that she was afraid of the
defendant; that he might inflict some harm upon
her; and testified: R. 634
"Q. And can you tell us what that fear
is based on?
"A. Well, two occasions during our marriage"MR. HYDE: Just a minute. I object
to anything prior to the decree.
"THE WITNESS: All right. Then since,
there have been several conversations on the
telephone where threats have been made. On
one occasion he said he didn't care what happened or how this turned out in the Supreme
Court, if I was awarded the children he would
see to it that I wouldn't live to raise them.
"Q. Now, you've heard the defendant's
testimony in which he stated that he told you
that he would use force if necessary to prevent you from taking the children out of the
state?
"A. Yes.
"Q. This conversation or threat that he
made to you, did it cause you to have fear
of him?
"A. Yes, it does.
"Q. Safety for yourself and your children?
"A. Yes."
The court at page 663 of the record stated:

"THE COURT: Well, of course, both
6
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parties, when we are through with this hearing, both parties are going to be restrained
from any unwarranted interference with the
other. And this Court is going to delineate
the sphere of activities of each party so there
is no question about these children being
picked up on Saturday and odd hours without
the consent and acquiescence of the other
other party * * * ." R. 663
Further, plaintiff testified that she had been
harassed both at her job, at hon1e, and by the telephone. And the plaintiff upon being requested by
the court to disclose her present employm·ent and
her telephone number, refused to do so. Whereupon the court at page R. 663 of the record, stated
to the plaintiff:
"THE COURT: There will be no worries
fron1 Mr. Mc_Broom, because he'll be in contempt of this Court if he in any way interferes
with you in connection with your job. So you
may tell the court where you work and what
hours."
The plaintiff had already lost her job at the Kennecott Copper Corp. and was fearful that further
harassment would cause her to lose her present
employment. R. 662. The court specifically indicated
it would restrain the defendant from in any way
interfering with the plaintiff's job, but failed to
include this as a part of the court's order. R. 664, 665.
The testimony of defendant with respect to the
court's order restraining plaintiff from removing
the children from the state of Utah without the
consent of the court is as follows: R: 616 line 21.
7
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"Q. Have you ever threatened Mrs. Me
Broom since this trial?

"A. (Mr. McBroom) When she told me
-yes, I threatened her to this extent that I
told her I would use force if necessary to prevent her taking the children out of th·e state
and me ever seeing them again. And I also
told her"Q. Well, now, what was the occasion for
this?
"A. A telephon·e call. It was this conversation around the end of May regarding the
appeal and this lawsuit. And I told her that
I'd use force to see that this didn.'t occur.
And I also promised her that I wouldn't
let her raise these children. Eventually I
wouldn't. I can't permit that. And what I
meant was that I had faith in the law. But
sh·e called me on it and she said, "You mean
law or no law, you're not going to let me
raise the children?" And I said, "I am going
to take those children period." And I can't
permit this. I can't do it." R. 617. Also see R.
615, 616, 620.
There was never any testimony by plaintiff to
the effect that she intended taking the children
from the state, except as a matter of self-preservation against the threats that the defendant was
making to do her physical harm. Plaintiff testified
at R. 637:
"Q. (By Mr. McCullough to Mrs. Me
Broom) Now, your husband testified that
there was a three-week period around May
8
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28th when you refused to allow the children,
allow him to visit the children because something about he did not agree to drop this
adultery suit. Do you recall any conversation
with him of that nature?
"A. (R. 638) I recall telling him that I
couldn't stand the constant phone calls, the
harassment, the threats of valentines, which
he refers to as being subpoen!as or court orders,
and that unless he left me alone I was going
to have to leave just for my own peace of
mind. I couldn't take it.
"Q. These telephone calls you refer to,
are they frequent?
"A. Every night. There wasn't a night
without them.
"Q. And have they caused you to become
upset?
"A. Yes. I have had the number changed
to an unlisted number just in the last few
days.
"Q. And that's because you couldn't
stand" A. Because I can't take it.
"Q. Did you ever tell the defendant that
you would not live up to the order of the
court?
"A. Never, never did."
Plaintiff testified that she had never degraded
the defendant in the eyes of the children (R. 627)
nor had she ever punished them because of their
having gone with their father for reasonable visitation. R. 628.
9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR $200.00 DELINQUENT SUPPORT
MONEY TO AND INCLUDING THE 23RD DAY OF JUNE, 1962.

The decree of divorce specified that the defendant was to pay $200.00 per month for the support
and maintenance of the .minor children, said payments to commence as of the 23rd day of March,
196.2. As of the 23rd day of June, 1962, the defendant
had made payments of only $600.00. According to
the decree four monthly payments had accrued for
a total of $800.00, leaving a deficiency of $200.00.
The defendant attempted to show by receipts, that
he had paid prior to the entry of the decree that
he was not delinquent in said support. However,
defendant's exhibit D (a) (1) shows a payment of
$200.00 on February 2, 1962, a payment of $200.00
on March 1, 1962, a payment of $75.00 on March 1,
1962, and a payment of a water bill for $25.00 on
March 1, 1962. All of said payments were prior to
the entry of the d·ecree of divorce on the 23rd day
of March, 1962, and cannot affect the order of the
court dated the 23rd day of March, 1962. Accordingly the lower court should be instructed to enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the sum of $200.00 delinquent support money
to and including the 23rd day of June, 1962. In
additio11 thereto, interest should be adde·d to said
judgment at the rate of sro per annum from the
due date, to-wit June 23, 1962, to date of judgment,
10
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and thereafter· at the rate of 8)'; per annum. See
LARSON v. LARSON, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421.
This court has ruled that the defendant has the
burden in a contempt proceeding to show the amount
of support money paid. See OPENSHAW v. OPENSHAW, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET UP
VISITATION RIGHTS FOR THE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER AND COUNTER PETITION.

The plaintiff specified in her answer and counter
petition the reasonable visitation which she felt the
court should award to the defendant, to-wit: that
the defendant should be able to pick up the children
and have them over night with him every other
weekend from Friday at 6:00 o'clock p.m. until Saturday at 6:00 o'clock p.m. That on alternate weekends the defen~dant should 'be able to pick up and take
the children with him on Sunday afternoons from
1:00 o'clock until 7:30 in the evening. The plaintiff's
testimony in detail is set forth in the statement of
facts showing the times and places when the defendant had taken the children prior to the hearing
before Judge Snow, and based thereon, certainly
the defendant could hav·e no reasonable grounds
upon which to complain that he was being denied
visitation. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in order
to know when the children were taken and at what
time, proposed a reasonable ·visitation period for
the defendant. Further, in view of the fact that
the plaintiff was working five days a week, she felt
11
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it was only proper that she should have a portion
of each weekend in which she could devote time to
the children. Specifically the plaintiff requested the
right to have the children on Sunday morning in
order to take them to Sunday School. The lower
court, however, in setting up the visitation periods
entirely ignored the suggestions of visitation on
the ~part of the plaintiff, and specified that defendant \should have and take the children from
3:00 o'clock p.m. on Friday to 7:30 p.m. the following
Sunday of every other weekend; that on the alternate weekend the defendant should have the right
to take them at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday morning
and return them that night at 7:30 p.m.
The lower court in substituting its judgment
for that of the plaintiff mother, has entirely ignored
the reasonable requests of the plaintiff. Certainly
if the trial court in awarding custody of these children to plaintiff felt she was competent to have
custody awarded to her, and a fit and proper person
for such, it should not then turn around and slap this
1nother in the face by telling her that the visitation periods which she has set out, and which are
entirely reasonable, are not proper. The court should
not arbitrarily set up periods of ti1ne which do
not conform to the mother's work schedule or give
her proper time to devote to the children. The effect
of the lower court's decree is to say to this mother
that you can have the children ''"'ith you on Sunday
every other wekend. The lower court did eliminate
12
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son1e of the difficulty which the plaintiff mother was
suffering because of the defendant's unrestrained
visitation of the children. And the lower court did
specify in paragraph 3 of its order, "The defendant
is restrained from taking said children with defendant except as herein provided without the consent of
plaintiff first had and obtained." R. 83.
The visitation which the plaintiff mother had
set up for the children and to which she testified in
detail certainly do not demonstrate that this plaintiff mother was attempting to limit or be unreasonable with the defendant with respect to visitation
\vith these minor children. In view of the stormy
proceedings and the animosity that exists between
these parties, it would seem unfair that the lower
court would substitute its judgm-ent for that of the
plaintiff mother with respect to the visitation
periods, particularly where the 'visitation periods
specified by the plaintiff mother are entirely reasonable and have been made in good faith on the part
of the plaintiff and for the best interests of the
minor children. Accordingly the plaintiff requests
this court to modify the visitation periods in accordance with the periods specified by the plaintiff in
her answer and counter petition before the court.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN
THE DEFENDANT FROM INTERFERING WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S JOB, OR HARASSING THE PLAINTIFF AT HOME_ OR
AT WORK, ON THE TELEPHONE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER,
AND IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM
THREATENING PLAINTIFF WITH BODILY HARM.

The testimony of the plaintiff and corroborated
13
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by the testimony of the defendant, all as specifically

set forth in the statement of facts, shows a definite
threat on the part of the defendant to inflict bodily
harm to the plaintiff, and to harass her on her job
and at home. The defendant made no secret of the
fact that he intended to continue such activity until
he had gained his objective of taking these children
from their mother. Based upon said expressed intention of the defendant, and particularly in view
of the fact that the lower court stated during the
court proceeding that it would protect the plaintiff
by a restraining order, the lower court should in
its final decree hav·e entered a restraining order
restraining the defendant from interfering with
plaintiff's job, or harassing the plaintiff at home or
at work, and restraining the defendant from threatening the plaintiff with bodily harm. The request
of plaintiff in this regard was reasonable, and
should have been granted in view of the testimony
of both plaintiff and defendant.
POINT IV.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DOWER COURT TO ·RESTRAIN
THE PLAINTIFF FROM TAKING THE l\IINOR CHILDREN OUT
OF THE STATE OF UTA·H, OR I·N ANY MANNER CAUSING
SAID CHIL'DREN TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF
UTAH.

The only purpose of the plaintiff in telling the
d·efendant that she would take the children and
leave, was to cause the defendant to cease his harassment, phone calls, and threats of "valentines."
In view of th·e expressed intention of the defendant
14
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that he was going to take the children from their
mother regardless of the circumstances ·and the
orders of the court, certainly the plaintiff's threat
to leave the state was the only protection she felt
she had recotlrse to. It is not necessary to repeat
the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant in this
regard. It is set forth in full in the statement of
fact. The order of the lower court does not do
justice to the situation and particularly in view of
the fact that the court has provided no safeguards
for the plaintiff's protection. If the lower court
felt there was sufficient justification for entering
an order of the type which it did, then in all fairness the lower court should have provided adequate
safeguards to the plaintiff in order that her removal
from the confines of the state would not be necessary to protect her from the threats of physical
harm by the defendant.
The plaintiff does not quarrel with the proposition as cited by this court and universally accepted
to the effect that the court should maintain control
of the minor children of the parties and maintain
said children within the jurisdiction of the court.
But having accepted such propostion, the court
should also provide adequate safeguards for the
plaintiff against the expressed threats of physical
15
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harm to her by the defendant. See GRIFFIN v.
GRIFFIN, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84; ALLEY v. ALLEY,
67 Utah 316, 247 P 301.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
304 East First South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appell,ant
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